
























zur Zukunft der Arbeit
Institute for the Study 
of Labor 
Teams Make You Smarter:
Learning and Knowledge Transfer in Auctions
and Markets by Teams and Individuals






Teams Make You Smarter:  
Learning and Knowledge Transfer in 




Imperial College London 
 
Matthias Sutter 
University of Innsbruck, University of Gothenburg and IZA 
 




University of Cologne and University of Innsbruck 
 
 







P.O. Box 7240   
53072 Bonn   
Germany   
 
Phone: +49-228-3894-0  





Any opinions expressed here are those of the author(s) and not those of IZA. Research published in 
this series may include views on policy, but the institute itself takes no institutional policy positions. 
 
The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center 
and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an independent nonprofit 
organization supported by Deutsche Post Foundation. The center is associated with the University of 
Bonn and offers a stimulating research environment through its international network, workshops and 
conferences, data service, project support, research visits and doctoral program. IZA engages in (i) 
original and internationally competitive research in all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of 
policy concepts, and (iii) dissemination of research results and concepts to the interested public.  
 
IZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. 
Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be 












Teams Make You Smarter: 
Learning and Knowledge Transfer in Auctions and Markets 
by Teams and Individuals
  
 
We study the impact of team decision making on market behavior and its consequences for 
subsequent individual performance in the Wason selection task, the single-most studied 
reasoning task. We reformulated the task in terms of “assets” in a market context. Teams of 
traders learn the task’s solution faster than individuals and achieve this with weaker, less 
specific, performance feedback. Some teams even perform better than the best individuals. 
The experience of team decision-making in the market also creates positive knowledge 
spillovers for post-market individual performance in solving new Wason tasks, implying that 
team experiences enhance individual problem-solving skills. 
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Introduction 
Many important decisions that, in principle, could be made by individuals are 
routinely made by teams. These include strategic decisions (e.g., boards of directors 
deciding on how much to invest in R&D, which products to launch, and in which 
markets to compete), allocation decisions (e.g., committees deciding on budgetary 
allocations), merit-based forecasting decisions (e.g., scientific panels deciding which 
research proposals to fund and editorial boards deciding which books to publish), 
intellective decisions (e.g., committees solving complex problems) and judgmental 
decisions (e.g., juries selecting winners of musical, literary, sport, and beauty 
contests).  
Most of these decisions are made by teams which are transient and temporary, 
being assembled by an external coordinator/supervisor or congregate spontaneously 
and voluntarily for a short duration, ranging from a few days (jury in a trial or a 
musical contest) to a few years (scientific review boards or directors of a company). 
These teams perform their duty and then disperse. Members are frequently selected 
based on their qualifications, experience or expertise, and often continue to make 
similar decisions as individuals when their service on the team is concluded. While 
there is a considerable amount of research comparing the nature and quality of the 
decisions made by individuals and teams, there is practically no work on the effect of 
being on a team on subsequent individual decisions. 
In this paper we provide a first step to fill this gap. We study a logical 
reasoning problem that (a) is hard to solve, leaving plenty of learning opportunity; (b) 
is general, allowing us to test for knowledge transfers from team decision making on 
subsequent individual performance; (c) can be embedded in the context of 
auctions/markets that offer unambiguous and identical opportunities and incentives to   Teams Make You Smarter  3     
   
all (teams and individuals), without (d) creating intra-group conflict. Our results 
indicate that teams (1) learn faster the solution to a reasoning problem than 
individuals; (2) need less specific (and weaker) performance feedback in doing so; (3) 
might even perform at a higher level than the best individuals, and (4) have significant 
spillover effects on post-market individual performance in the same task, such that 
individuals who have been members of a team on the market – rather than having 
traded on their own – are better able to solve similar reasoning tasks. 
 
Related literature 
Previous research indicates that, in general, teams perform better than 
individuals (Tindale, Kameda & Hinsz, 2003).
1 For instance, teams are better in 
solving intellective tasks (e.g., Laughlin, 1980) and are better calibrated in assessing 
their knowledge (Allwood, & Granhag, 1996). Teams have also been shown to play 
more strategically in signaling games (Cooper & Kagel, 2005), demonstrate higher 
levels of strategic sophistication in normal-form games (Sutter, Czermak & Feri, 
2010), and coordinate more efficiently than individuals in coordination games (Feri, 
Irlenbusch & Sutter, forthcoming). Teams are more competitive and less likely to 
collude (Bornstein, Kugler, Budescu & Selten, 2008). Their behavior approaches the 
game-theoretic equilibrium more closely than individuals in the ultimatum game 
(Robert & Carnevale, 1997; Bornstein & Yaniv, 1998), the centipede game 
(Bornstein, Kugler & Ziegelmeyer, 2004), the trust game (Kugler, Kocher, Sutter & 
Bornstein, 2007), the beauty-contest game (Kocher & Sutter, 2005), the dictator game 
                                                 
1 There are, however, limitations to this general pattern (see, for instance, Barber & Odean, 2000; 
Levine & Moreland, 1998).   Teams Make You Smarter  4     
   
(Luhan, Kocher & Sutter, 2009), and in common pool dilemmas (Gillet, Schram & 
Sonnemans, 2009). 
  The superiority of teams – relative to individuals – has been attributed to the 
“truth-wins” norm, suggesting that teams perform at the level of the best of an equal 
number of individuals (Laughlin & Ellis, 1986). Successful teams engage in active 
discussions, allowing team members to put themselves in the shoes of their opponent 
(Cooper & Kagel, 2005). These discussions allow team members to identify 
erroneous reasoning, reject incorrect solutions, and stimulate a more thoughtful 
engagement with the task at hand (Davis, 1992). 
Given that, everything else being equal, teams perform better than individuals, 
we seek to test whether this superiority (like team membership) is transient and short-
lived, or has longer-term consequences and carries over to post-interaction individual 
behavior. To put differently, we seek to establish that tackling a task as part of a team 
causes people to analyze it better and learn to solve it more effectively, allowing us to 
quantify the “benefits of team membership” for individual decision-making. 
 
The Present Studies 
We report the results of three studies designed to address these questions. In 
study 1 we seek to determine whether teams learn the solution to a reasoning problem 
faster than individuals in competitive auctions. In study 2 we test whether members of 
teams transfer their acquired knowledge more successfully to a set of new problems 
that need to be solved individually. Finally, in study 3 we test whether teams require 
weaker and less specific performance feedback to achieve these outcomes.     Teams Make You Smarter  5     
   
All three studies have a common structure consisting of three independent 
stages. In the first stage, participants attempted to solve a version of the Wason 
selection task individually (see Table 1 and the next section for details). In the second 
stage participants submitted bids for potential solutions in combinatorial auctions 
(Studies 1 and 2) or traded solutions in double auctions (Study 3). Participants either 
interacted individually with three other individuals or were part of two-person teams 
that interacted with three other two-person teams. In the third stage, participants were 
asked to solve new versions of the Wason selection tasks individually (Table 1).   
Next we describe the Wason selection task in more detail and explain the 
auction mechanism that was used in Study 1 and 2. The market mechanism used in 
Study 3 will be introduced in the methods section of Study 3. 
 
The Wason Selection Task 
The task was originally designed to test whether individuals employ the rules 
of formal logic, when testing conditional statements of the form “if p, then q” 
(Wason, 1966). In the standard problem, individuals are shown four cards. The cards 
have a letter on one side and a number on the other side. The participants’ task is to 
verify the conditional rule “if there is a vowel (p) on one side, then there is an even 
number (q) on the other side” by identifying the minimal number of cards that must 
be flipped to fully test whether the rule is true or false. The cards shown are: E (p), K 
(not-p), 2 (q), and 7 (not-q). Formal logic analysis requires checking (a) the truthful 
implication of the rule by flipping the card E (p) and (b) the potential falsification of 
the rule by flipping the card 7 (not-q).   Teams Make You Smarter  6     
   
  Typically, only around 10% of the participants solve the problem correctly 
(Griggs & Cox, 1983). Most participants select card E (p). Many choose only this 
card and others select the incorrect combination of cards E (p) and 2 (q). These 
findings have been replicated in numerous studies, rendering the task “the single most 
investigated problem in the psychology of reasoning” (Evans & Over, 1996, p. 356). 
 
The Auction Mechanism (Study 1 and 2) 
The purpose of the auction was to study whether participants can learn the 
correct solution to the Wason selection problem in an interactive, yet competitive 
setting. Participants were told that each card has a color on one side and a geometric 
figure on the other side. The four cards shown in the instructions were: red (p), black 
(not-p), triangle (q), and rectangle (not-q). For the remainder of the article, we refer to 
the p card as Card I, the not-p card as Card II, the q card as Card III, and the not-q 
card as Card IV. Participants were instructed to test the rule “If the card is red (p) on 
one side, then there is a triangle (q) on the other side” (see Table 1). 
We used a combinatorial auction, allowing participants to submit buying 
offers (bids) for each of the 15 possible card combinations (see Figure 1 for a 
schematic screenshot of the auction and a complete listing of the card combinations). 
This procedure - in the context of the Wason selection task - was first used by 
Maciejovsky and Budescu (2007). 
At the beginning of each trial, participants were endowed with 500 ECU 
(Experimental Currency Units) which were equivalent to €5 ($6.75 at the time of the 
study). A total of 16 cards (four Cards I, four Cards II, four Cards III, and four Cards 
IV) were auctioned on each trial. During each trial, participants could submit bids for   Teams Make You Smarter  7     
   
any card combination, as long as they had enough cash holdings. At the end of each 
trial, the winners of the auction were determined by a computer program 
implementing an algorithm designed to maximize the auctioneer’s (experimenter’s) 
revenue (i.e., the bids before paying dividends). The algorithm used an exhaustive 
enumeration of card partitions (for a brief discussion of a similar problem see 
Sandholm, 2002, or Pekeč & Rothkopf, 2003).  
After each trial, participants (teams or individuals) were awarded dividends of 
200 ECU per correct pair of cards (I and IV), regardless of which other cards they 
held. (Teams’ payoffs were doubled and split equally between the two members.)  
Dividends were paid out at the end of the experiment and, hence, could not be used to 
increase one’s cash endowment of subsequent trials. Participants were not allowed to 
convert their ECU holdings to actual cash at the end of the experiment. We introduced 
this restriction to induce participants to acquire cards, rather than saving up their cash 
holdings. Finally, to keep the auction mechanism simple, we did not allow 
participants to buy cards on credit. 
The participants in our studies were either individuals or two-person teams. 
More precisely, each auction consisted of four individual bidders or four two-person 
teams. Individuals/Teams were randomly assigned the role of participant/team A, B, 
C or D. Each experimental session consisted of multiple auction trials (30 in Study 1 
and 10 in Study 2), and each trial lasted 60 seconds.  
The specifics of the auction (e.g., performance feedback, payment selection) 
as well as the market mechanism for Study 3 will be explained together with the 
experimental design and procedure of the various studies in the following sections. 
   Teams Make You Smarter  8     
   
Study 1: Do Teams Learn Faster Than Individuals in Combinatorial Auctions? 
Participants: One hundred twenty undergraduate students (42.5% male) from 
the University of Jena, aged 19 to 36 years (M=23.24, SD=2.92), participated in the 
study.  
Experimental Design and Procedure: We contrasted learning, and subsequent 
knowledge transfer, in 10 markets consisting of four individual bidders each (n=40), 
and in 10 markets consisting of four two-person teams (n=80) each. Subsequently, we 
refer to the two conditions as the INDIVIDUAL and the TEAM condition, 
respectively. 
In every experimental session we had either 16 or 20 participants. In Stage I, 
participants were asked to solve one Wason selection task (first problem of Table 1) 
individually. Correct choices were rewarded with €4 ($5.40), but feedback was 
presented only at the end of the experimental session.  
In Stage II, participants were randomly assigned to groups of four in the 
INDIVIDUAL condition and to groups of eight in the TEAM condition. In the latter, 
participants were randomly split into four two-person teams, and were given time to 
discuss the problem prior to market opening. During the market phase, teams were 
requested to bid on cards in the 30 consecutive one-minute auctions (identical to the 
INDIVIDUAL condition). Payoff feedback about dividend earnings was provided 
privately to individual participants and teams after each trial.  
In Stage III, participants were asked to solve eight Wason problems 
individually (for a complete listing see Table 1). The location of the solution cards 
was varied across the problems (meaning that in some problems the solution was to 
flip cards I and IV, in others to flip cards II and IV, I and III, etc.). This task tests for   Teams Make You Smarter  9     
   
general knowledge transfers, because participants need to fully understand the 
solution concept of the problem to consistently identify the correct card combinations.  
At the conclusion of a session, participants were paid their combined 
earnings from Stage I, three trials from Stage II (one randomly drawn auction from 
each block of 10 auctions: 1-10, 11-20, 21-30), and one randomly chosen problem 
from Stage III. In addition, individuals received €2.50 ($3.38) for showing up. 
Participants in the TEAM condition received a show-up fee of €4.00 ($5.40).
2 
Sessions lasted about 120 minutes and participants earned, on average, €8.06 ($10.88, 
SDs = €3.67 / $4.95). 
 
Results 
Stage I: The average rate of correct solutions was 20.0%. The solution rates of 
subjects who were subsequently assigned to the INDIVIDUAL and TEAM conditions 
were 22.5% and 18.75%, and did not differ significantly. 
Stage II: To study whether participants learned to bid for the correct cards, we 
computed the proportion of bids on the correct solution (
t i
C B
, ) out of the total amount 
of submitted bids (
t i cash
, 500− ) for each participant/team (i) on each auction trial 
(t). Bids on the correct solution were defined as bids for the combination of Cards I 
and IV, as well as bids for those two individual cards, when placed at the same time 
and for the same number of cards: 
                                                 
2 The difference in show-up fees reflects the fact that the laboratory for team decisions was located 
further away from the university.   Teams Make You Smarter  10     
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Bids are denoted byB , subscripts indicate card types (I, II, III, or IV), n 
denotes the number of bids, and superscripts denote participants/teams (i) and trials 
(t). Note that our definition of bids on the correct solution is conservative and 
represents a lower bound of the target quantity. Although participants received 
dividends for card combinations that included redundant cards in addition to the 
solution (e.g., I, II, and IV), our definition of learning requires participants to identify 
the solution cards precisely. 
  Since bidding in the auction is a function of all the bidders in a group, the unit 
of statistical analysis is the auction rather than the individual bidder or the team. The 
proportion of bids on the correct solution was aggregated across the four 
individuals/teams in each auction. Figure 2 shows the proportion of bids that was 
placed on the correct solutions as a function of experimental condition and trial. We 
observe a monotonic increase of bids on the correct solution across auctions for both 
experimental conditions, suggesting that participants learn the correct solution. 
We averaged the bids across auction blocks of 5 trials (block 1: trials 1-5, 
block 2: trials 6-10,..., block 6: trials 26-30) and subjected them to a 2-way mixed 
ANOVA with the between-subjects factor decision unit (INDIVIDUAL vs. TEAM) 
and the within-subjects factor auction block (1 - 6). The results show significant main 
effects for decision unit, F(1, 18)=5.64, p<.05, η
2=.24, and auction block, F(5, 
14)=6.16, p<.05, η
2=.69, and no interaction effect.    Teams Make You Smarter  11     
   
Stage III: Overall, subjects solved, on average, 56.7% of the tasks correctly. 
To isolate the net learning effect, we consider only those participants who failed to 
solve the Wason task in Stage I. We compared the corresponding solution rates of 
those participants who bid individually with those who bid as part of teams in Stage 
II. The results of a Mann-Whitney test indicate that solution rates do not differ 
significantly between these groups (z=1.03, p>.05), suggesting that there was no 
advantage to individuals bidding in teams (M=51.54%) over bidding alone (42.74%) 
in terms of knowledge transfer. 
 
Discussion 
Study 1 demonstrates that in the context of combinatorial auctions 
considerable learning takes place and it is transferred successfully to post-auction 
behavior. In terms of our main hypothesis we found that teams learned the solution to 
the Wason selection task much faster than individuals, but members of teams were not 
necessarily more successful in transferring their knowledge to a set of new reasoning 
problems in Stage III. This latter result might be due to the length of bidding: The 
learning advantage of teams, evinced by the proportion of correct bids, diminishes 
across the 30 auction trials with respect to the individual auctions (see Figure 2). This 
means that at the beginning of Stage III subjects both from the INDIVIDUAL and the 
TEAM condition achieve similar levels of learning. As a consequence, we do not 
observe differences in the transfer of knowledge. 
To test this explanation, we investigate next whether teams are superior to 
individuals in terms of transferring their knowledge to new problems when the 
learning phase is much shorter – 10 auctions, instead of 30.    Teams Make You Smarter  12     
   
Study 2: Do Teams Transfer Their Knowledge More Successfully than Individuals in 
Combinatorial Auctions When Less Time for Learning is Available? 
Participants: One hundred twenty undergraduate students (45% male) from 
the University of Jena, aged 18 to 34 years (M=22.56, SD=2.82), participated in the 
study. None of them had participated in Study 1. 
Experimental Design and Procedure: In every experimental session we had 
either 16 or 24 participants. Sessions lasted about 95 minutes and participants earned, 
on average, €6.75 ($9.11, SDs=€3.17 / $4.28). 
Study 2 is an exact replication of Study 1 with two changes: We reduced the 
number of auction trials from 30 to 10, and we determined payoffs for Stage II by 
randomly selecting only one of the 10 trials (instead of paying three out of 30 trials as 
in Study 1 – where we also selected one trial from the first ten trials, though).  
 
Results 
Stage I: The average rate of correct solutions was 28.3%. The solution rates of 
subjects who were subsequently assigned to the INDIVIDUAL and TEAM conditions 
were 27.5% and 28.75%, and did not differ significantly.  
Stage II: Figure 3 shows the proportion of bids on the correct solution across 
trials as a function of experimental condition. We analyzed the proportion of bids on 
the correct solution in a 2-way mixed ANOVA with the between-subjects factor 
decision unit (INDIVIDUAL vs. TEAM) and the within-subjects factor auction block 
(auction trials 1-5 vs. auction trials 6-10). The results show significant main effects 
for decision unit, F(1, 18)=4.54, p<.05, η
2=.20, and auction block, F(1, 18)=10.55, 
p<.05, η
2=.37, but no interaction effect.    Teams Make You Smarter  13     
   
Stage III: Overall, participants solved, on average, 56.98% of the transfer 
problems. We compared the solution rates of those participants who failed to solve the 
Wason task in Stage I and bid individually or as part of teams in Stage II. Individuals, 
who participated as part of teams, solved a significantly higher percentage of transfer 
problems (56.36%) than individuals who participated in individual auctions (27.59%) 
(Mann-Whitney test z=2.76, p<.05).  
 
Discussion 
Study 2 replicates all the results of Study 1 regarding the superior learning of 
teams, and demonstrates that individuals who bid as part of teams were more 
successful in transferring their acquired knowledge to a set of new Wason problems 
than the individual bidders when the learning period was relatively short.  
In Study 3 we extend these findings by testing whether teams can achieve 
similar results with weaker and less specific performance feedback. To test this 
hypothesis we use a market mechanism – a continuous double auction – that makes 
learning more difficult in comparison to the combinatorial auctions. We also 
manipulate the quality of earnings’ feedback between successive trading periods. The 
distinctive characteristics of the double auction markets that make learning more 
difficult are: 
-  The market is “thin” (only four traders per auction), which leads to noisy trading 
prices. 
-  Participants engage in buying and selling activities at the same time, making it 
harder to properly track trading activity.   Teams Make You Smarter  14     
   
-  Individual traders cannot be identified (and imitated). Only aggregate (and 
anonymous) market behavior is observed.    
-  The traders’ motivation is ambiguous since this mechanism provides an 
incentive to acquire incorrect cards, as long as traders believe that other 
participants may wish to buy these cards later at a premium.  
-  Cards are traded individually. Since the solution requires traders to hold two 
cards to receive dividends, they expose themselves to execution risk (holding 
one card by itself is worthless without having the other).  
We hypothesize that teams would achieve higher levels of learning and would 
be more successful at transferring their knowledge than individuals, despite the noisy 
market mechanism. Hence, study 3 provides a stress test for the robustness of our 
findings. 
 
Study 3: Do Teams Require Less Specific Performance Feedback Than Individuals? 
Participants: Two hundred forty undergraduate students (41.67% male) from 
the University of London, aged 19 to 36 years (M=22.92, SD=2.68), participated in 
the study. Sessions lasted about 100 minutes and participants earned, on average, 
£13.34 ($19.89, SDs=£4.58 / $6.83,). 
Experimental Design and Procedure: We contrasted learning, and subsequent 
knowledge transfers, in a 2 (decision unit: INDIVIDUAL vs. TEAM) by 2 
(performance feedback: strong vs. weak) between-subjects design. We had 10 markets 
in each of the four cells, with n=40 participants in each of the two individual 
conditions, and 40 dyads (n=80) in each of the two team conditions.    Teams Make You Smarter  15     
   
  In Stage I, participants were asked to solve the Wason selection task (first 
problem of Table 1) individually. Correct choices were rewarded with £2 ($2.98), but 
feedback was presented only at the end of the experimental session. 
  In Stage II, participants were randomly assigned to experimental conditions 
and traded the cards of the second Wason selection task (second problem of Table 1) 
in computerized double auctions (implemented with the software z-Tree, Fischbacher, 
2007). This procedure was first used in this context by Budescu and Maciejovsky 
(2005). Trading only started when participants had solved correctly all the items of a 
short quiz, designed to check understanding of the instructions. 
  Each market consisted of 12 trading periods during which participants could 
buy and / or sell the four cards simultaneously in continuous anonymous double 
auctions (see Figure 4 for a schematic screenshot of the auction). Each market 
consisted of four participants (individuals or two-person teams). At the beginning of 
each period, participants were endowed with 120 ECU (exchange rate: 100 ECU = 
£10) and with four cards of the same type (i.e., Card I, II, III, or IV). To induce 
trading, only one participant in each market was endowed with a given card. The card 
assignment was determined randomly in each period. 
  Trading periods lasted for 180 seconds. Participants could submit bids and / or 
asks; they could also accept standing offers (bids and asks) by other market 
participants. Only improving offers, i.e., higher bids and lower asks, were allowed. 
Participants were shown lists of concluded contracts for each card (in chronological 
order) and were informed about the remaining trading time and the current period 
number. Participants were not granted any credit and were not allowed to sell cards 
short, i.e., they were only allowed to make bids up to their cash holdings and submit 
asks for cards they actually owned.     Teams Make You Smarter  16     
   
If participants held the correct cards at the end of an auction period, they 
received dividends of 80 ECU for each complete set of solution cards. We varied the 
quality of the performance feedback that participants received at the end of each 
trading period (see Figure 5 for a schematic screenshot of the information provided). 
Participants in the strong-performance feedback condition were informed about the 
dividends associated with each of the four cards separately (see Figure 5a). In 
contrast, participants in the weak-performance feedback condition were only shown 
the aggregate amount of dividends, without a direct link to the individual card 
holdings (see Figure 5b).  
At the end of the auction, one period was randomly selected and participants 
obtained their cash holdings and dividend payments for that particular period at the 
end of the experimental sessions. 
In Stage III, participants were asked to solve eight new Wason problems 
(identical to Study 1 and 2) individually. One of the eight problems was randomly 
selected and participants received £2, if they solved it correctly, on top of their 
earnings from Stage I and II. If participants’ total earnings fell short of £4 ($5.96), 
they received this amount.   
 
Results 
Stage I: The average solution rate was 7.9% There was no significant 
difference between subjects who were later assigned to the INDIVIDUAL (8.8%) and 
TEAM condition (7.5%).  
Stage II: Figure 6 shows the average trading prices for the four cards across 
periods as a function of interaction and feedback. Prices for correct (incorrect) cards   Teams Make You Smarter  17     
   
were generally higher (lower) for TEAM (INDIVIDUAL) traders and with strong 
(weak) performance feedback. To study whether participants learned to identify the 
correct cards, we aggregated the trading prices across periods for each of the four 
cards as a function of experimental condition and the 10 market cohorts. We then 
computed the average trading price for the correct cards and subtracted the average 
trading price for the incorrect cards. This measure was subjected to a 2-way ANOVA 
with the between-subjects factors decision unit (INDIVIDUAL vs. TEAM) and 
performance feedback (strong vs. weak). The results show significant main effects for 
decision unit (F(1, 35)=87.39, p<.05, η
2=.71) and performance feedback (F(1, 
35)=10.58, p<.05, η
2=.23), but no interaction effect (see Table 2).   
Stage III: Overall, participants solved, on average, 42.71% of the transfer 
problems. Isolating the learning effect by considering only those participants who 
failed to solve the Wason task in Stage I, we compared the corresponding solution 
rates of those participants who bid individually with those who bid as part of teams. 
Individuals, who participated as part of teams, solved a significantly higher 
percentage of transfer problems (43.67%) than individuals who participated in 
individual auctions (27.23%) (Mann-Whitney test z=2.25, p<.05). 
To investigate the combined effects of decision unit and performance 
feedback, we computed for each individual the percentage of correct choices across 
the eight transfer problems and subjected this measure to a 2-way ANOVA with the 
between-subjects factors decision unit (INDIVIDUAL vs. TEAM) and performance 
feedback (strong vs. weak). The results show a significant main effect for decision 
unit (F(1, 236)=5.90, p<.05, η
2=.02), but neither a significant effect for performance 
feedback nor an interaction effect.  
   Teams Make You Smarter  18     
   
Discussion 
Study 3 shows that teams were able to learn the correct solution to the Wason 
selection problem in competitive markets with less specific (and weaker) performance 
feedback than individuals. To put our results in perspective note that the panels 
pertaining to the cards that make up the correct solution in Figure 6 show that the 
trading prices of teams with weak feedback are indistinguishable from the prices of 
individuals with strong feedback. Members of teams were also more successful in 
transferring their acquired knowledge to new problems in Stage III. 
 
Synopsis: What Accounts for the Superior Learning, and Transfer of Skills, in Teams? 
A straightforward explanation of our findings is that teams perform at the level 
of their best members. According to such a “truth wins” norm, a knowledgeable 
minority of group members can convince the majority by demonstrating the correct 
solution (Laughlin, 1980). This effect would shift the level of learning and knowledge 
transfers upward in teams (relative to individuals). To test this explanation we 
compared learning rates (inferred from the proportion of bids on the correct solutions 
in Studies 1 and 2) between the best individual in each cohort (aggregated across all 
trials) to the average team in each cohort (aggregated across trials). We did not find 
statistically significant differences between these distributions for Studies 1 and 2, 
meaning that the average team performs as good as the best individual, but not better. 
  However, a similar analysis for Study 3 shows that the average team 
performance is significantly better than the best individual traders. This analysis is 
based on the contrast between submitted bids for Cards III and IV. All our prior 
analyses suggest that the crucial indication of identifying the correct solution in the 
Wason selection task hinges on the insight that Card IV is essential to test it, while the   Teams Make You Smarter  19     
   
incorrect Card III seems the initially most likely candidate for a majority of subjects. 
Consequently, we calculated for each individual/team the difference in bids 
submitted for Card IV and Card III, aggregated this measure across periods and 
compared the best individuals (as defined by the maximum difference between the 
bids submitted for Card IV and Card III) to the average team in each cohort as a 
function of performance feedback. The results show significant main effects for 
decision unit (F(1, 36)=7.59, p<.05, η
2=.17) and performance feedback (F(1, 
36)=5.90, p<.05, η
2=.14), but no interaction effect (see Table 3).  
Another way of confirming the superiority of teams is to compare team and 
individual performance on markets where none of the participants solved correctly the 
Wason problem in Stage I. There were a total of 24 such markets (10 in the TEAM 
condition and 14 in the INDIVIDUAL condition). We ran the same ANOVA of the 
difference in bids for Card IV and Card III on this restricted sample and obtained 
similar significant effects for decision unit (F(1, 20)=28.94, p<.05, η
2  =.59) and 
feedback (F(1, 20)=6.25, p<.05, η
2  =.24), confirming that teams do better than 
individuals and strong feedback is more effective than weak feedback. 
These results provide evidence that teams are capable of performing at a 
higher level than the best individual traders! A reasonable explanation is that team 
members challenge each other’s solutions, thereby inducing deeper, and more critical, 
levels of thinking and analysis, which help in identifying the correct solution. The fact 
that we observed this finding in Study 3 – the most difficult market mechanism for 
learning – and not in Studies 1 and 2, might be related to this very point. We speculate 
that individuals might be more motivated – and hence more likely to challenge each 
other’s solutions and explanations – in more complex environments.  
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Conclusions 
We have studied the impact of team decision making on market behavior and 
on subsequent individual performance in the Wason selection task, the single-most 
studied reasoning task. While there has been considerable research comparing the 
nature and quality of the decisions made by individuals and teams (see, e.g., 
Bornstein, Kugler & Ziegelmeyer, 2004; Bornstein & Yaniv, 1998; Cooper and 
Kagel, 2005; Feri, Irlenbusch & Sutter, forthcoming; Kocher and Sutter, 2005), there 
has been no work on the effects of being on a team on subsequent individual decisions 
and problem solving skills. 
Our results on the differences between individuals and teams are largely in 
line with earlier studies, as they confirm that teams tend to perform better than 
individuals: Teams of traders learn the correct solution to the Wason task faster than 
individuals and achieve this with less specific performance feedback. Teams can even 
beat a very high threshold – the truth-wins norm – with less precise feedback. This 
seems to be driven by the teams’ tendency to analyze more carefully the more 
complex problems.  Although we do not have direct evidence, we suspect that some 
of the processes that were shown in other contexts to affect individual decision 
makers such as susceptibility to compelling and persuasive arguments (e.g., Bishop & 
Myers, 1974; Burnstein, 1982), or sensitivity to being evaluated by others (e.g., 
Curley, Yates & Abrams, 1986) play a role in this.  
The main contribution of our paper relates to the degree of knowledge transfer 
from team decision making to subsequent individual tasks. Recall that all participants 
had to make a similar number of decisions – either individually or as members of two-
person teams – in the auctions and markets run in Stage II of our three studies. We 
have found that the decision unit (acting individually or as a team) in Stage II has a   Teams Make You Smarter  21     
   
tremendous impact on the participants’ performance in Stage III where they had to 
solve individually eight new Wason selection problems. In particular, having been a 
member of a team in Stage II led to higher solution rates in Stage III, and the 
difference to participants who had acted individually in Stage II was significant in 
studies 2 and 3 where the opportunities for learning were shorter and feedback was 
less precise.  
Table 4 summarizes the rate of transfer for individuals and groups across all 3 
studies (Stage III). We classify the transfer scores into 3 categories: 0-1 suggests no 
(or almost no) transfer, while 7-8 indicates perfect (or almost perfect) transfer. The 
other category (2-6 solutions) suggests mixed results, but only a small minority (13%) 
of the subjects falls in this group. The overall distribution is almost symmetric with, 
essentially, equal numbers of people in the no transfer and perfect transfer categories, 
but note that the pattern is different in the two groups: The modal classification for 
INDIVIDUAL is no transfer (54%) and for TEAMS it is perfect transfer (48%), and 
the two distributions are significantly different
2
2 ( 9.89; 0.01). df p χ =< Thus, we can 
safely conclude that the experience of team decision making increases individual 
problem solving skills. An important topic for future research is to determine the 
boundary conditions of this effect. More specifically, how stable and persistent is the 
effect over time and to what degree does it generalize to other problems. 
Our key finding of positive knowledge spillovers from team decision-making 
to subsequent (post-interaction) individual behavior, and the associated enhanced 
problem-solving skills, has important managerial implications. It supports the use of 
teams in organizational tasks not only as a means to get better decisions, but also as a 
training tool to improve the skills of individuals for subsequent individual tasks,   Teams Make You Smarter  22     
   
suggesting that team decision-making can be used as a training instrument in human 
resource development. 
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Table 1: Materials Used in Studies 1-3  
 Cards 
Stage I:  I  II  III  IV 
1. If the card is blue on one side, then there is a 
square on the other side. (I, IV) 
    
Stage II:         
2. If the card is red on one side, then there is a 
triangle on the other side. (I, IV) 
    
Stage III:         
3. If the card is blue on one side, then there is a 
square on the other side. (I, IV) 
    
4. If there is a small triangle on one side, then 
there is a $-symbol on the other side. (III, IV) 
    
5. If there is a vowel on one side, then there is 
an even number on the other side. (II, III) 
    
6. If there is a circle on one side, then the card 
is yellow on the other side. (I, II) 
    
7. If there is an arrow that points to right on 
one side, then there is a large cube on the other 
side. (II, IV) 
    
8. If the card is grey on one side, then there is 
an &-symbol on the other side. (I, III) 
    
9. If a person gets a bonus, she must have sold 
more than 125 units. (I, IV) 
    
10. If a person drinks alcohol, she must be 
older than 21 years of age. (I, IV) 
    
 
Note: Correct card combinations are shown in parentheses. 
K  E  7  2 
       
       
$    ₤   
       
       
  &  §   






Beer  Cola  21 yrs  16 yrs 
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Table 2: Difference Between the Average Trading Price for Correct Cards and 
Average Trading Price for Incorrect Cards as a Function of Decision Unit and 
Performance Feedback (Study 3) 
 Performance  Feedback 
 Weak  Strong 
Decision Unit  Mean (SD)  Mean (SD) 
Individual  4.77 (7.90)  10.24 (6.97) 
Team  23.03 (7.04)  31.21 (3.95) 
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Table 3: Difference Between Average Submitted Bids for Card IV and Card III as a 
Function of Decision Unit and Performance Feedback (Study 3) 
 Performance  Feedback 
 Weak  Strong 
Decision Unit  Mean (SD)  Mean (SD) 
Best Individual  10.51 (19.07)  18.05 (8.87) 
Average Team  19.28 (9.19)  29.98 (6.14) 
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Table 4: Distribution (in %) of Number of Correct Solutions in the General Transfer 
Task (Stage III) across Studies and Experimental Conditions 
Correct Solutions  Individuals  Teams  Total 
No Transfer (0-1)  54  39 44 
2-6  13 13 13 
Perfect Transfer (7-8)  33  48  43 
Sample  size  160 320 480 
Note: The modal category is bold face  Teams Make You Smarter  30 
   
Figure 1: Schematic Screenshot of the Combinatorial Auction (Study 1 and 2) 
 
Trial 4  Seconds 9 You are PARTICIPANT C 
Your cash 
holdings: 
I   
Combination  Price  Quantity
II   
III   
IV   
I, II   
I, III   
I, IV   
II, III   
II, IV   
III, IV   
I, II, III   
I, II, IV   
I, III, IV   
II, III, IV   
I, II, III, IV   
SUBMIT
I  -  80 (1)  -  99 (1) 
II  -  80 (1)  -  - 
III  -  80 (1)  -  - 
IV  -  80 (1)  -  - 
I, II  -  -  -  - 
I, III  -  -  -  - 
I, IV  -  -  -  - 
II, III  -  -  -  - 
II, IV  -  -  -  - 
III, IV  -  -  -  - 
I, II, III  -  -  -  - 
I, II, IV  -  -  -  - 
I, III, IV  -  -  -  - 
II, III, IV  -  -  -  - 
I, II, III, IV  -  180 (1)  -  - 
Combination  1  2  3  Current 
Mean Bid (Quantity) in Trial 
Participant C 
I - - - -
II - - - -
III - - - -
IV - - - -
I, II - - - -
I, III - - - -
I, IV - 190 (1) - -
II, III - - - -
II, IV - - - -
III, IV - - - -
I, II, III - - - -
I, II, IV - 155 (1) - -
I, III, IV - 155 (1) - -
II, III, IV - - - -
I, II, III, IV - - - -
Combination 2 3 4 Current
Participant D 
Mean Bid (Quantity) in Trial
I - - 50 (3) -
II 70 (1) - - -
III 69 (1) - 50 (3) -
IV 1 (1) - - -
I, II - - - -
I, III - - 199 (1) -
I, IV - - - -
II, III 180 (1) - - -
II, IV - - - -
III, IV - - - -
I, II, III - - - -
I, II, IV - - - -
I, III, IV - - - -
II, III, IV - - - -
I, II, III, IV 180 (1) - - -
Combination 1 2 3 Current
Participant B 
Mean Bid (Quantity) in Trial
I  -  -  99 (1)  - 
II  -  -  -  - 
III  -  -  -  - 
IV  -  -  99 (1)  - 
I, II  -  -  -  - 
I, III  190 (1)  -  -  - 
I, IV  -  -  151 (2)  - 
II, III  -  -  -  - 
II, IV  -  -  -  - 
III, IV  -  -  -  - 
I, II, III  155 (1)  -  -  - 
I, II, IV  -  -  -  - 
I, III, IV  155 (1)  -  -  - 
II, III, IV  -  -  -  - 
I, II, III, IV  -  -  -  - 
Combination  1  2  3  Current 
Participant A 
Mean Bid (Quantity) in Trial   Teams Make You Smarter  31 
   
Figure 2: Average Proportion of Bids on the Correct Solution (and Standard Errors) in 
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Figure 3: Average Proportion of Bids on the Correct Solution (and Standard Errors) in 
the Individual Condition and the Team Condition across Auction Trials (Study 2) 
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Figure 4: Schematic Screenshot of the Double Auction (Study 3) 
 









































































   Teams Make You Smarter  34 
   





























b: Weak Performance Feedback 
 
 
At the end of this period your cash holdings are: 44 ECU 
 
Your card holdings and dividend payments are: 
 Card  Holdings  Dividends 
Card I  2  40 
Card II  0  0 
Card III  1  0 
Card IV  1  40 
 
Your dividends are: 80 ECU 
Your total earnings are: 124 ECU 
At the end of this period your cash holdings are: 44 ECU 
 
Your card holdings are: 
 Card  Holdings 
Card I  2 
Card II  0 
Card III  1 
Card IV  1 
 
Your dividends are: 80 ECU 
Your total earnings are: 124 ECU         
Figure 6: Average Trading Prices for the Four Cards as a Function of Experimental 
Condition and Period (Study 3) 
 
 
 
 
 